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FOREIGN TRADE
tively little competition in international export markets, may induce investment at home with high multiplier effects. One may speculate why the export tariff is rarely used by the developed nations. Perhaps this may be explained by the relatively greater competition in manufactured products vis-&-vis raw materials such as diamonds and copper. In the case of raw materials, it is more difficult for new producers to enter the market place unless the entering countries are by chance endowed with the same chance factors -presence of minerals, in the case of diamonds or copper, or the right climatic and natural circumstances, in the case of agricultural goods. On the other hand, modern technology is highly exportable. It is much more difficult for a country to corner a technique. These differences in the composition of trade between developed and less developed nations explain the relative confinement of the export tariff to the developing nations. W I ashington's foreign trade policy is primarily determined by two fundamental Acts of Congress: the Export Control Act of 1949 and the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (known as "Battle Act") of 1951. The former, being administered by the Department of Commerce, prohibits exports of so-called strategic goods, as defined by the United States and its allies. The latter, for whose application the State Department is responsible, authorises and instructs this Department to institute measures against such foreign nation or alliances of nations which trade with other states that threaten the US or its own allies.
Trade Relations Between the US and China

The Embargo Policy of the US
Principally in response to the demand of the United States, the mounting tensions between East and West have led to the creation of a multilateral system of trade controls, in 1949, at a conference in Paris, directed against the "Sino-Soviet Bloc". A Consultative Group, consisting of two separate committees, was set up, of which the first one came into life in 1950 and was known as the Coordinating Committee, COCOM, to deal with trade with the countries of the Soviet Bloc in Europe. The second one was the child of worldwide reorientation induced by the Korean War. It saw the light of day in 1951 and was called the China Committee, or CHINCOM, designed to control trade with Asian communist countries. With the sole exception of Iceland, all the member governments of NATO and that of Japan are represented on these two committees 1. In order to prevent shipment of strategic goods, four embargo lists were drawn up containing the description of goods whose exports are either totally prohibited or subject to special permission. List No. 4 is the "China List" which names all the goods that must not be shipped to either Red China or North Korea.
It took till 1957 before the special China List was abandoned, and the two former COCOM and CHINCOM committees were merged. At the same time, all exports to Far Eastern Communist states were transferred to List No. 3, which contains names and descriptions of goods whose shipments are being restricted through controls imposing a modified embargo. In 1958, export controls were further reduced through adopting only two lists, known as the Embargo List and a further list naming controlled exports.
This meant that both the states of Western Europe and Japan were able to resume "normal" trade relations with the People's Republics of China and North Korea, which were only subject to the rules and regulations of the supra-national agreement. But the United States, during all this time and later, did not participate in this general loosening of restrictions, keeping in being their strict trade embargo against China. The formal reasoning behind this abstention from trade with China was that the Korean War had not been terminated by a true peace treaty but merely by a general truce. This was set out in a programme of ten points, culminating in the proclamation that the Government wanted to "contain China without isolating her". 2
A Period of ReorlentaUon
The Failure of the Embargo Policy
The total embargo which the United States had imposed on trade with China in 1950 was not dismantled in all the following years, and it came progressively under more and more severe criticism 3.
The main argument against this policy was that the embargo of the US had been shown to be ineffective and was losing its impact gradually, in time, since such an attempt to isolate another power made sense only if and when this power was on the brink of total breakdown.. There had been a point, during the early' sixties, when the People's Republic of China was nearing such a calamity, because the Soviets had then begun to reduce deliveries of supplies under the impact of the quarrel between Moscow and Peking and, at the same time, China was suffering from the effects of several bad harvests, but the United States' allies jumped into the breach and aided Red China. Naturally, there was also widespread discontent about American businessmen being prevented from having a share in potential business deals with China, from which America's allies were profiting. It was stated that the creation of a united front of all western countries vis-a-vis Red China had proved not to be feasible, and this again would lead to cracks and weaknesses in the western system of alliances. Moreover, continuing the embargo would spread a false picture of real conditions among the US public.
From the end of November, 1967, Washington made it clear that it had developed a more flexible policy towards Red China 4, but only in the third quarter of 1968, Red China began to turn its interest again to foreign policy, as a completely new beginning, after the disorders of the Cultural Revolution had passed 5. The main change was that ideas about potential "peaceful coexistence" with the US were put on record. However, the reaction to this innovation was much stronger in Moscow than in Washington.
It was not before February, 1969 , that Will Rogers, the new Secretary of State, suggested, inter alia, mutual exchanges of journalists and scientists. In July of the same year, Washington for the first time unilaterally withdrew certain restrictions on travelling to, and trading with, China. US citizens got general permission to import into the United States goods to a maximum value of $100, and certain groups of US citizens were granted conditional permission to visit Red China 6.
But only in October, 1969, it was reported that the Americans were willing and prepared to resume Chinese-American talks on the ambassa-3 See here and passim "Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, Implications for US Policy", by Alexander E c k s t e i n. New York, 1966, pp. 243 FOREIGN TRADE dorial level. The response of Peking, however, was a stiffening of the Communists' attitude, probably because the problem of Taiwan was still as far from a solution as ever, and because of the continuing struggle in Indochina.
Policy Revision
Conspicuous inroads into US trade restrictions became known in December, 1969: notably, foreign associate companies of US concerns were granted permission to trade with the People's Republic of China, Such firms may both sell goods to Red China, provided they are not specifically embargoed, and buy and resell Chinese products, but not in the United States themselves. And tourists from the US may now buy products from Red China to a total value of more than $100 and to bring them back to the US. Finally, museums, universities, and art collectors in the US may, for their own use and possession, import unlimited quantities of Chinese works of art.
But the new measures did not set up any volume of trade in whose path policy might follow: the Chinese did not develop a demand for goods from the US, because other western countries offered to supply identical products. There is another reason why the limited "liberalisation" of trade with China by the US will be deprived of success: two thirds of the total of volume of all Chinese trade with the West are bought and sold during the two annual trade fairs in Canton, but US businessmen are not allowed to attend them.
Not surprisingly, there was no response from Peking to the US opening the door for the China trade to a limited extent. Only certain quarters in Hong Kong's industries showed some discomfiture because they feared US companies be- 
Boom a Prema-
the previous year's corture Conclusion responding value. This includes a particularly conspicuous increase of new orders booked in the capital goods sector, i.e. of 8.1 p.c. as against May and 4.8 p.c. vis-&-vis the previous year. This development has been repeatedly interpreted as an extension of the intermediate boom in spring. But this conclusion is obviously a premature one. Domestic demand in nominal terms is slightly declining since March, Adjusted for price a distinct levelling is to be noticed. This is particularly valid also for demand for capital goods -in spite of dynamic impulses originating from vivid demand for durable consumer goods (cars and electrical appliances) that are statistically ascertained as capital goods. The stimulation of foreign business in capital goods according to VDMA (Association of German Engineering Companies) is to be traced back above all to a non-recurring extarordinarily high incoming order of the shipbuilding industry. The process of a slow cyclical decline of demand mainly in the capital goods sector is, however, continuing. This is also indicated by the reduction of orders in hand (3.1 months according to IfoInstitute for Economic Research, Munich). According to calculations of BP Benzin and Petroleum AG-taking into consideration the data so far available-power consumption increased from 168.9 mn tons of hard coal units (SKE) to 172.3 mn tons of SKE.
Dr Egon Overbeck, Member
Two factors should have been responsible for this comparatively lower growth rate: the business trend and the temperature. Due to the close connection between economic growth and power consumption the declining boom justified the anticipation of a lower growth rate of power consumption, too. Moreover, in the first half of 1970 the average temperature was below the long-term average while in the first six months of 1971 it hardly deviated from this value. Therefore in the first half of 1971 the demand for power for heating purposes was smaller.
DisUnct Decline in the Iron, Sheet and Metal industry
In the first half of 1971 the business trend in the iron, sheet and metal processing industry distinctly weakened although a pronounced differentiation could be noticed between the individual sectors. Measured by the total volume of orders, incoming orders declined slightly in the first half of the year, so orders in hand were reduced in many enterprises. The Association of the Iron, Sheet and Metal Processing Industry (EBM) taking into consideration cost and price increases is now talking about a stagnating production in this branch, which today comprises 3,399 enterprises with approx. 392,000 workers and employees. So far prices of most EBM-products have remained stable, only in a few sectors price adjustments were the reaction on highly increased costs. In May EBM-producer prices in domestic trade surpassed the previous year's level by 6.7 p.c. At the same time export prices were a good 6.0 p.c. above last year's level.
Property Formation Differing According to Professions
Property formation of the index households continued to rise in the first quarter of 1971 as compared with the previous year's corresponding period. However, the development is different for the individual types of households. The monthly property formation of two-persons households of pensioners and recipients of social security payments according to newest data of the Federal Statistical Office have risen at the surprising rate of 78.0 p.c. to DM 56.30. Four-persons households with a medium income also obtained the comparatively high growth rate of 41.5 p.c. to DM 179.38. On the other hand, in the case of four-persons households of public officials and employees with a higher income the growth rate of property formation with 9.0 p.c. to DM 379.04 was below level.
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[] US registered ships may in future carry Chinese products between non-communist ports, and US owned but foreign-registered ships may ply their trade also on routes calling on Chinese mainland ports;
[] In addition, President Nixon foresaw the possibility to permit direct imports into the US of Chinese goods, but before this will be possible, a "positive list" of non-strategic goods must be compiled and published, to cover permissible direct exports to China.
On June 11, President Nixon published the new regulations covering imports from, and exports, to China lo. Trade goods of US origin which may be freely exported to China are broken down into 47 non-strategic groups, mainly products of farming, forestry, and fishing; tobacco; fertilisers and certain chemicals; textiles; electrical appliances and equipment; certain types of electronic equipment; motor vehicles and spare parts for them. At the time, US markets have been thrown open generally to imports from China, but subject to federal controls.
The reasons for this attempt of the US to resume closer relations with China may be deemed to be mainly the following ones: [] On purely pragmatic grounds, it is assumed that the two powers, after having lived in mutual isolation for 22 years, should attempt to draw nearer to each other; [] to continue the policy of "keeping China in quarantine" might under present conditions in the world, lead to the US becoming isolated itself; [] the export industries of the US have started to see more positive aspects in the trade with China.
The Government in Peking presumably believes that better relations with the US might ease China's entry into UNO. It may also be assumed that Chinese communists foresee that US recognition of their regime will form part and parcel of a general shifting of the balance of power in the Far East, which they welcome, especially regarding Taiwan and Japan, whose influence in South East Asia is likely to grow if the Nixon Doctrine is realised. The Chinese will likewise be interested in scotching any possibility of the US and the USSR cooperating closely. And finally, it may be expected that Red China does not want to be excluded from a general settlement if and when the war in Indo-China will be terminated.
No Guarantee of Success
It is extremely difficult to forecast future developments in US-Chinese political relations. Equally difficult is any safe prediction as to what influence Washington's economic measures will have on the expansion of the China trade of the US, the more so as the change in the relations between China and the US is mainly of a political nature, whilst trade policies will initially play only a subordinate part.
Any look at China's foreign trade figures, however, will make it clear that the violent quarrel between the USSR and China, which broke out in the early' sixties, has caused a shift in Chinese trade relations towards western countries (see Table 1 ), though the People's Republic of China, relative to its sheer geographical vastness, its enormous population, and the size of its internal trade, carries on a foreign trade of negligible proportions.
The further China's economy progresses, the stronger will be the likelihood that, similar to East European states, the Peking Government will realise that foreign trade induces economic growth, and will use this potency. Provided that political conditions remain stable, the share of non-communist states in China's foreign trade will continue to rise. This assumption seems justified, because the USSR is currently deemed to be the People's Republic of China's most dangerous opponent, and because the West will have a much larger capacity to produce and supply the goods required by Peking.
Future Prospects of US-Chinese Trend
By request of the Committee for American-Chinese Trade, Professor Dernberger has developed forecasts about trade trends up to 1980 likely to prevail in US-Chinese relations. Assuming favourable conditions, he expects annual Chinese imports from the US to the equivalent of US $ 650 mn, and Chinese exports to the US of $ 250 mn. Presumably, Red China will export mainly farm produce and import principally industrial equipment, machinery, and mineral raw materials. Provided commercial exchanges between the US and Red China develop as predicted, trade relations between the Chinese People's Republic and other western countries cannot fail to be affected, especially in regard to transit trade through third-party countries, which will then go the direct way 11
But even the most optimistic assessment cannot hold out a prospect of large-scale US trade with Red China for the near future, nor will it be possible, In view of the possible volume of such transactions, to derive sizeable advantages for the US balance of payments from such trade. ' 
